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ABSTRACT 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT IMPACT OF NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN 
PAKISTAN 
 
By 
 
AMER AFAQ 
 
 
Decentralization and local government autonomy have become major features of 
reforms in governance over the past two decades. It is argued by policy analysts that 
decentralization is a step towards making governments more responsive, efficient and 
accountable to citizens as it improves public service delivery and enhances citizens 
participation. The results of decentralization, however, have been mixed and 
inconsistent across the globe.  
 
This thesis is an attempt to analyze the new local government reforms introduced in 
Pakistan in 2001. The study finds that although decentralization has provided a 
mechanism for devolving power to the local level, the overall impact on improvement 
of public service delivery has been partial.  
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Chapter1: Introduction 
Over the past two decades, governments around the world have been undertaking 
decentralization in some form or the other. The reasons vary. They include demand from 
local communities for a greater say in the government of their community; bringing 
decision-making closer to those affected will produce better outcomes and greater 
accountability; and, less creditably, the desire of the central governments to offload 
some of their expenditures responsibilities.  
Historically, the control of central government in administration, resource allocation, 
development management and decision making has been pivotal. In most of the 
developing countries of Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa central 
planning was a dominant practice in order to run the government effectively in 1950s. It 
was however realized that central governance failed in social, political and economic 
development, eventually resulting in widening the gulf between the rich and poor 
classes of society. Many states thus started to look for new systems of administration 
and development management of public sector. The World Bank (1992) explains that 
prospects for development become elusive when the capacity of public service 
management is flawed. Public sector in the developing countries is usually characterized 
by the poor revenue collection, huge expenditures and large size but underpaid civil 
servants. 
Despite criticism, decentralization, in its various forms has been favored by many 
policy analysts. ‘Total centralization (all authority being vested in a single individual 
who takes decisions) is infeasible even for the most efficient autocrat in a micro state 
(Turner and Hulme, 1997:151)’. Proponents of decentralization have stressed upon 
numerous benefits that can be acquired with its appropriate practice and implementation 
e.g. Smith (1985) advocates democratic decentralization, arguing that it brings about 
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changes in civil society by political education, skill enhancement in political leadership, 
political stability and equality, accountability, participation and improved 
responsiveness of government.    
‘Decentralization is usually understood to refer to the expansion of local autonomy 
through the transfer of powers and responsibility away from national bodies. 
Centralization and decentralization thus highlight different territorial divisions of power 
within the state between central (national) and peripheral (regional, provincial or local) 
institutions’ (Heywood 2000: 237). Devolution has been defined by Heywood (2000) as 
‘the transfer of power from central government to subordinate regional institutions (to 
devolve means to pass powers or duties from a higher authority to a lower one). 
Devolved bodies thus constitute an intermediate level of government between central 
and local government.  
This research probes into the development impacts, if any, that have been brought by the 
new local government system in Pakistan. Development itself is a very broad term 
however discussion of this research will focus only on improvements in public service 
delivery. Pakistan’s history since independence is chequered with political instability 
and economic turmoil’s with a few exceptions. The concept of decentralized local 
government is not new to Pakistan but it has been much of rhetoric than reality. Looking 
into its historical political context, it is very interesting to see that three most significant 
decentralization reforms in almost six decades old history of Pakistan were introduced 
in military regimes, the non-representative governments, including the existing one. 
Recent reforms introduced are rendered somewhat successful by the international 
multilateral institutions, at least in enhancing political representation and political 
participation of common man on the grass root level to some extent. Pakistan, ruled by 
the army for many years, hardly ever had a truly representative, elected government 
since its independence in 1947.   
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As argued by Cheema et al (2005), local government systems have been enacted by non 
representative governments in order to somehow legitimize their control over the state. 
‘Legitimacy has been sought by creating a localized patronage structure that produces a 
class of ‘collaborative politicians’ who act as conduit between local constituencies and 
the non representative centers’ (Cheema et al 2005:24). Like always, in the current 
move towards decentralization reforms in Pakistan, there is hardly any incentive offered 
to the local level elected government for developing public service delivery.  
Management and control over the funds and resource allocations are still retained with 
central and provincial governments. Decentralization from provincial to local levels is 
said to be the government’s centre of focus so far which in turn recentralize the 
concentration of powers in to the hands of federal government. Despite a wide range of 
shortcomings and flaws in these nascent reforms, it would wrong to conclude that the 
reforms are futile. 
Although it is hard to gauge the impact of decentralized government in provision of 
public social services like health, water & sanitation, education and law enforcement. 
However, a true representative local government at District, Tehsil 1/Town, and Union 
levels, lower tiers of local governments, have started functioning to some extent in 
decision making processes. “While the local government still have little revenue raising 
abilities, and have effectively limited ability to decide their expenditures given that the 
majority expenditure is in the forms of fixed “establishment costs”, the delivery of most 
public services has now come under their purview. While these local governments’ 
future is still uncertain given their limited constitutional support and conflict with the 
provincial governments, what is clear is that if they remain, we are likely to see an 
                                            
1 There is no precise translation for tehsil. In Pakistan Districts are divided in to administrative units 
called tehsils that represents the middle tier of local government. Tehsils are further divided into Unions. 
(Williamson et al 2005).  
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impact on the delivery of these public services.” Cheema et al (2005: 32).  
Another, salient feature of the new local government system is the enhanced public 
participation in the provision of basic services and development. This has been achieved 
through social development and empowering the local communities. For the first time in 
the history of Pakistan, Citizen Community Boards (CCB) are formed which are 
directly responsible for provision of basic services and development initiatives of a 
particular community. These boards are, in-fact, a step towards participatory 
development approach in which the local masses or their representatives are involved 
right from the planning phase till the completion of a project. 
1.1 Research Questions 
This research aims to study the overall development impact of the new local 
government system in Pakistan with a particular focus on public service delivery and 
social development. The study is aimed at assessing the outcomes of devolved powers 
to lower tiers of the society and analyzing the constraints of local governments which 
hinders their pace of improvement. The questions that the thesis will try to cover are:  
• To what extent has decentralization occurred in Pakistan? Has the authority been 
delegated to the lower tiers of local government? 
• What is the impact of new local governments on improvement of basic services 
delivery? 
• Has the new local government system empowered the local level communities?  
• What are the factors that hinder the achievement of progress, expected from the 
new system? 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
This thesis is an attempt to study the new local government system in Pakistan. 
Particular focus on the impact assessment of decentralization reforms is of significant 
nature in this study. Relevant contributions of these reforms have been investigated e.g. 
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enhancement of political representation at lower tiers and changes in provision of 
service delivery. Initial complexities and vague policy frame work is analyzed in order 
to contribute in paving the way forward. Impacts of decentralization are inter-related 
and are mainly dependant on each other. Analysis of such changes and improvements, if 
any, is thus the primary objective of the research. It is quite possible that this study 
might breed new questions and identify problems and hence induce further research in 
the proposed area of knowledge. 
1.3  Research methodology and strategies 
In order to achieve the purpose of writing this thesis, a research strategy with two main 
components is applied. First, a wide and deep literature review; second, the analysis of 
the secondary data available on the subject under focus. 
Deductive research strategy will be used in this study as the study aims to test the 
theoretical arguments put forward in favor of decentralization for better service delivery 
and social development. The conceptual link between decentralization, service delivery 
and social development will be applied to the decentralization process presently 
undergoing in Pakistan. The study will mainly rely on secondary sources like books, 
periodicals and research papers related to the impact of decentralization in Pakistan. The 
study is based on qualitative data with little involvement of quantitative data.  
The secondary data that I will use in my analysis can be divided into three main areas: 
first, laws and regulations that constitute the legal framework of the local governance 
system in Pakistan; second, up-dated socio-economic statistical data and social 
indicators from several official statistical agencies in Pakistan, as well as regional and 
international statistical data, such as World Bank, Asian Development Bank; and, third, 
press reviews and news reports related to the topic. 
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1.4  Organization of the study 
The Thesis has been divided into five chapters:  
Chapter-1 is the introduction and it gives an insight into the research questions that the 
study will answer; research methodology, structure of the study and its limitations. 
Chapter-2 would give an account of theoretical understanding of characteristics of good 
governance model, New Public Management (NPM) and decentralization as catalyst for 
improved public service delivery. It would also highlight general empirical evidences 
from the developing world. 
Chapter-3 highlights salient features of the new local government system along with 
brief history of local governments in Pakistan. 
Chapter-4 includes analysis of the impact of decentralization in Pakistan. This chapter 
studies the post-decentralization scenario of public services delivery sectors like health, 
education and water and sanitation.   
Chapter-5 will summarize the main findings and conclude the study.  
1.5 Limitations of the study: 
Since the local government system has recently been introduced, availability of 
authentic reports on the impact of decentralization in Pakistan is limited. The new 
system was introduced in August 2001, and it is too early to say if it has been successful 
in achieving its objectives. However, there are some reports and studies available, which 
can tell us about the changing trends in services delivery and development.   
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Chapter 2:  Decentralization and Service Delivery 
The economic stagnation of 1970s and 80s, failure of centrally administered planning, 
increase in the level of poverty in developing countries despite more aid to them, the 
inefficient delivery of basic social services and clamor for more participation by poorer 
segments of society in public policies, and democratization at local level have forced 
many developing countries to decentralize authority and resources to local levels. The 
disillusionment with central governments to provide effective public services has been 
linked to over concentration of power and resources at the central level.  
Centralization of power was considered necessary in 1950s and 60s for the efficient 
allocation of scarce resources for rapid economic growth and integration in the countries 
that secured independence from colonial powers. Centralization was also promoted to 
deal with escalating demands and mass mobilization unleashed by decolonization and 
modernization (Huntington, 1968). It was also consistent with the economic theories of 
the time promoted by World Bank (Cheema and Rondenelli, 1983). However, policies 
of centralization failed to materialize and thus the argument for decentralization was put 
forward to tackle diverse issues facing developing countries.  
Corruption, illiteracy, lack of basic and technical education, poverty and military 
dictatorships didn’t allow standardized models of governance to yield considerable 
benefits in the developing world. The concept of good governance was hence 
introduced as a panacea for such problems and for more efficient use of resources. 
Although a consensus on standardized paradigm for efficient governance, which would 
fit into the political and social structures of all the nations of the world, is exceptional to 
find, a more general and broad framework has been proposed by many experts in this 
field. This chapter examines the concepts of governance and New Public Management 
(NPM) and establishes a link between decentralization and improvement in public 
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service delivery in theory and in practice.  
2.1 Governance  
Govern means to rule or control others. Heywood (2000) briefly defined various 
concepts in which governance can be perceived. The main characteristic of governance 
is the ability to make collective decisions and the capacity to enforce them. Governance 
is broader term than ‘Government.’ Governance refers to the various ways through 
which social life is coordinated. Principal modes of governance are markets, hierarchies 
and networks. Markets coordinate social life through a price mechanism which is 
structured by the forces of supply and demand. Hierarchy includes bureaucracy and 
traditional forms of government organization, operating through top down authority 
systems.  
Networks are characterized by informal relationships between equal agents or social 
agencies. Governance reflects changes that have taken place within government as well 
as in society. These changes include development of new forms of public management 
in which government is increasingly confined to steering (setting targets and strategic 
objectives) as opposed to rowing (administration or service delivery). ‘The word 
government is from a Greek word, which means “to steer.” The job of government is to 
steer, not to row the boat. Delivering services is rowing, and government is not very 
good at rowing’ (Saves, cited in Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 25). 
Hyden and Court (2002) defined governance as ‘the exercise of economic, political, and 
administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels.’ According to them it 
comprises the mechanisms, processes, and institutions, through which citizens and 
groups express their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and 
mediate their conflicts. Governance is said to have three legs: economic, political, and 
administrative. So it can be conceived in political, institutional and socioeconomic 
aspects. Political setup of a country formulates laws for the citizens. Social aspect 
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implicates the way citizens are affected by politics. Economic aspect is concerned with 
laws and policies regarding markets, income, monetary and fiscal issues. World Bank 
(1992, cited in Allen & Thomas, 2000) identified four aspects of governance. They are 
public sector management, accountability, legal framework for development, and 
information and transparency. 
Hyden and Court (2002:25) argued that governance is characterized by the following 
principles.  
• Participation: Degree of involvement and ownership of affected stakeholders. 
• Decency: Degree to which the formation and stewardship of rules are 
undertaken with out humiliation or harm of the people. 
• Fairness: Degree to which rules apply equally to everyone in society regardless 
of status. 
• Accountability: Degree to which public officials elected / appointed are 
responsible for their actions and responsive to public demands. 
• Transparency: Degree to which decisions made by public officials are clear and 
open to scrutiny by citizens or their representatives. 
• Efficiency: Degree to which rules facilitate speedy and timely decision-making. 
2.2  New Public Management (NPM)  
In 1980’s and 1990’s new managerial approaches emerged in public sector as a result of 
inadequacies of the traditional model of public administration. Pollitte (1990) named 
this approach as “Managerialism” while Hood (1991) called it New Public Management, 
abbreviated as NPM (Hughes, 1998). NPM, an emerging model in public sector is 
considered as the replacement of the traditional model of public administration. 
Manning (1996, cited in Minogue 2001) explains that financial, qualitative and 
ideological pressures led to emergence of NPM.  NPM is considered as one of the most 
efficient model of good governance and decentralization. 
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Hughes (1998) favoring NPM argues that traditional bureaucratic model which had 
validity in its times was becoming obsolete. He considers it inappropriate to bifurcate 
politics from administration and believes that NPM would concentrate more on results 
and flexibility. However, NPM emerged with a lot of political and economical 
innovations for societies like decentralization, privatization, performance appraisals, 
contracts in public sector services, result oriented structural adjustments, more 
competition and blend of public and private sector. 
NPM supports the notion of resource allocation through market supremacy as it is 
contemplated as the most efficient and effective way. Public managers would be more 
accountable. Public would have more options and better incentives would stimulate the 
performance of public servants. NPM requires government to minimize expenditures 
and think as business decision maker. State intervention is accepted and welcomed in 
situations like market failures but only as a coordinator and facilitator of market based 
economy. These arguments received criticism in return questioning the accountability of 
autonomous managers, conflicts arising from competition and the uncertainty factor in 
public sector service. 
According to Hughes (1998), OECD countries are getting more inclined towards 
contractual, participative and less discretionary style of relationship between 
hierarchical levels and institutions whether public or private. Focus is on  
• Improvement of production performance of public sector  
• Greater use of private sector 
Besides this consistency, accountability, transparency and performance of public sector 
were desired, whereas Hood (1991 , cited in Hughes 1998) considers Managerialism as 
a shift towards more internal changes, believing that it’s about professional management, 
performance measurement, output orientation, decentralization, greater competition, 
private style of management and extreme vigilance in use of resources. 
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2.3  Decentralization  
Decentralization is the shifting of authority from the central government to local level 
authorities, granting them relative autonomy and increased resources, along with the 
new responsibilities. It has been defined by various writers in numerous ways. But most 
of the writers on decentralization would agree that it involves delegation of authority, 
shifting of resources, and relative autonomy to lower tiers. B. C. Smith (1985:1) defines 
decentralization as ‘the delegation of power to lower levels in a territorial hierarchy, 
whether the hierarchy is one of governments within a state or offices within a large scale 
organization’. 
Manor (1999:6) has defined devolution as the transfer of resources and power to lower 
level authorities, largely or wholly independent of higher levels of government, which 
are democratic to some degree. The definition reflects outcomes of increased 
participation, responsiveness, and accountability on top of democratic elections. 
To Rondenelli and Cheema (1983) decentralization is the transfer of planning, decision 
making or administrative authority from central government to its field organizations, 
local administrative units, semi autonomous and parastatal organizations, local 
governments or non-governmental organizations. They further argue that different forms 
of decentralization can be distinguished primarily by the extent to which authority to 
plan, decide and manage is transferred from the central government to other 
organizations and the amount of autonomy the decentralized organizations achieve in 
carrying out their tasks. 
Bardhan (1997) views decentralization from a different perspective. He distinguishes 
decentralization in the sense of devolution of political decision making from mere 
administrative delegation of functions of the central government to their local branches. 
He also separates the political and administrative aspect of decentralization from those 
   12
 
of fiscal decentralization. He cautions that not all these aspects of decentralization 
operate simultaneously in any particular case and that it is quite possible that a given 
economy may be decentralized in some aspects and not in others. 
Aaron Schneider (2003:33) has divided decentralization in three different dimensions 
i.e. fiscal, administrative and political. According to him ‘decentralized systems are 
those in which central entities play a lesser role in any or all of these dimensions. In 
such systems, central governments possess a smaller share of fiscal resources, grant 
more administrative autonomy, and/or cede a higher degree of responsibility for 
political functions’. 
2.4  Forms of Decentralization 
There are different forms of decentralization in practice. It includes administrative, 
political and fiscal decentralization. Administrative decentralization is the distribution 
of authority, resources and responsibilities among the different levels of government. 
Political or democratic decentralization gives more powers to local citizens and their 
representatives in any kind of decision making regarding local subjects. Fiscal 
decentralization is the transfer of decision making powers over raising taxes and the 
expenditure of that fund. Some other common types of decentralization are devolution, 
delegation and deconcentration. 
2.4.1  Devolution 
Devolution is the total transfer of powers and resources from the central government to 
the local units. Devolution is considered to be the strongest form of decentralization 
because it implies the complete transfer of administrative authority to the sub-national 
or regional governments (Katsiaouni, 2003). It enables the local authority to formulate 
policy and implement decisions on their own initiative without recourse to the central 
government. 
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2.4.2  Deconcentration 
While devolution is the complete ceding of authority to the local governments on local 
subjects deconcentration is only the shifting of functions and resources including 
personnel from the centre to other locations. The logic behind deconcentration is that 
decisions can be made on the spot by the bureaucrats who are ultimately responsible to 
the centre. In this way more employment opportunities are created at the local level and 
services are delivered more efficiently while the centre still retains the power. 
2.4.3  Delegation 
Delegation is the transfer of functions and authority to semi-autonomous bodies or 
public enterprises. It implies transfer or creation of broad authority to plan and 
implement decisions concerning specific activities or a variety of activities within 
specific spatial boundaries to an organization that is technically and administratively 
capable of carrying them out without direct supervision by a bigger administrative unit 
(Rondenelli, A. and Cheema, S. 1983). The purpose of delegation is to bypass the 
central bureaucracy and avoid the day-to-day controls in running the new enterprise. 
2.5  Decentralization and Development 
Decentralization is regarded, today, as a panacea for most of the problems being faced 
by the developing world. There is a long list of the problems faced by developing world 
which decentralization is said to be able to address like delivery of public services, 
poverty reduction, participation, integration, etc. This development burden which is 
placed on decentralization according to Smith (1983) is too great for it to bear and Third 
World countries who find much promise in decentralization are often disappointed by 
the results which fall short of these expectations. 
A large volume of theoretical arguments have been deployed to make the case that 
greater decentralization within the state will assist poorer countries to develop more 
rapidly, reduce poverty at the local level and facilitate provision of basic social services. 
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Smith (1983) categorizes the benefits of decentralization in six forms which include 
political education, training in political leadership, political stability, political equality, 
and accountability and responsiveness. Some of these benefits like political education 
and leadership training are rarely mentioned these days as benefits of decentralization. 
The emphasis that we see today is on accountability and responsiveness argument of 
decentralization which is seen as improving the quality of services delivered by state. 
Political participation and political stability are also commonly cited political benefits of 
decentralization claimed by contemporary national leaders (Turner and Hulme, 1997). 
Similarly, Rondenelli (1981) cites 14 specific benefits that may be gained from 
decentralizing authority and resources to lower levels. 
Another theoretical argument for decentralization is that it improves participation of the 
people. In a decentralized political system citizens have more opportunities to 
participate in political decision making since the whole process of decision making is 
broken down to smaller units. Decentralized state apparatus therefore provides more 
access and control over the bureaucracy for its citizens than a centralized one. Ahmed J. 
et al (2005) elaborate this point of accountability. By devolving responsibility for public 
services to local level, according to them, means that politicians who are responsible are 
now locally elected. This would make them more accountable to the people as they can 
monitor them more closely and attribute changes in service quality to them more easily. 
This creates a web of accountability i.e. the accountability of local politicians to the 
citizens, service provider’s accountability to the local politicians and of the local 
politicians to the policy makers at the centre. Azfar (2001) argues that devolving 
authority to the local level reduces corruption and brings productive efficiency in the 
government as sub-national governments are closer to the people where citizens are 
considered to be more aware of the actions of government than of the central 
government. Although Manor (2002) disagrees with him who says that it has limited 
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promise in reducing corruption and absenteeism.    
Manor (2002) asserts that decentralization enhances the uptake and thus the impact on 
health, education and environmental programmes. The reason of the impact in these 
areas is that decentralization makes it possible to adapt such programmes to local 
conditions and preferences. It also provides a framework to replicate development 
success from one arena into many others. Although, according to him, it has only 
limited utility in alleviating poverty and promoting economic growth, but by opening 
the policy and political processes to ordinary citizens it can do much to enhance their 
well being and to make their livelihoods and development more sustainable. He also has 
set some essential conditions for the success of decentralization in all these areas. These 
conditions are that decentralized authorities must be provided with adequate funds to 
accomplish important tasks; powers to make decisions required to complete such tasks; 
and reliable accountability mechanism to ensure both the accountability of elected 
representatives to citizens and the accountability of bureaucrats to elected 
representatives.   
Paul Francis et al (2003) assert that decentralization is considered to be a cornerstone of 
good governance in promoting local accountability and transparency and in enforcing 
local participation, leading to improved efficiency of public service provision and more 
appropriate services for the poor. 
Asante (2003) explains the link between decentralization, poverty reduction and service 
delivery through a diagram (Figure-1). The diagram shows that decentralization 
empowers the people and assures their participation in decision-making which would in 
turn make the representatives more responsive to the needs of the poor. Empowerment 
and participation have three-fold implications: control over the local statutory bodies, 
increased influence of the citizens over state institutions and, most importantly 
improved public goods and services provisions. The overall outcome is promotion of 
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development and alleviation of the many common causes of poverty. 
Figure 1: Linkage between Decentralization, Service Delivery and Poverty 
Reduction 
 
(Source: Asante, 2003) 
International Financial Institutions are more focused on decentralized system for 
improving service delivery and poverty reduction than ever before. Under the ‘good 
governance’ agenda during 1990s funds were given only on the condition to promote 
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policies of good governance i.e. devolving authority to the lower tiers and bringing 
government closer to the people. World Bank Report (2004) making a case for 
decentralization says: ‘Increasing poor clients’ choice and participation in service 
delivery will help them monitor and discipline providers. Raising poor citizens’ voice, 
through the ballot box and widely available information, can increase their influence 
with policymakers— and reduce the diversion of public services to the non-poor for 
political patronage. By rewarding the effective delivery of services and penalizing the 
ineffective, policymakers can get providers to serve poor people better’ (WDR, 2004:1). 
An underlying aim of these policies is seen as curtailing the influence of central 
government in state affairs and making way for privatization.   
Consistent with the above views, other authors point out more possible advantages of 
employing a strategy of decentralization including: increasing participation for the rural 
poor (Korten, 1980), decreasing the communication gap between the centre and the 
rural areas, improving local and regional planning, facilitating project implementation, 
increasing the capacity of local level administrators, and increasing local participation 
(Rondenelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1983; Bryant and White, 1982).  
The mainstream economic arguments for decentralization focus on the proposition that 
public goods are best provided to self-governing individuals unless there are cost 
savings in joint provision.  Decentralization can help the economy mainly in three ways. 
First, the share of all national tax revenues devolves from central government to the 
municipalities. Most importantly these funds can be allocated on per capita basis rather 
than any ad hoc political criteria. Second, the local committees can work more 
vigilantly to oversee the spending of funds. Third, local governments are better able to 
address preferences of local communities than central governments, thereby improving 
resource allocation (Mackintosh and Roy, 1999: 6-12).  
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In terms of economics, decentralization improves efficiency. It enhances the scope of 
consumers’ choice between public goods. Decentralization reduces cost, improves 
outputs and utilizes human resources more effectively. Politically it consolidates the 
political skills, accountability and national integration by bringing governments closer 
to the citizens. It promotes liberty, equality and welfare. Decentralization has 
particularly been associated with pro-poor policies. Rondinelli (1983, cited in Smith 
1985:186) believes that ‘if development is to mean eradication of poverty, inequality 
and material deprivation it must engage the involvement and mobilization of the poor. 
Participation of poor in politics is assisted to a great extent by decentralization 
programmes, strengthening their material and political position. Decentralization is 
believed to improve access to administrative agencies (De Mello, 1981).  
2.6  Decentralization in Practice 
The practice of decentralization around the world shows mixed results. In some 
countries decentralization has been successful while in others it has failed to have any 
positive effects on improving service delivery and poverty reduction. The overall 
performance of decentralization is not as good as the arguments made in the theory. One 
of the reasons for the poor performance is that decentralization is not implemented with 
intentions of better service delivery  and development but to achieve political goals like 
central control and political stability.  
Bardhan (2002) cautions that although decentralization experiments are going on in 
many developing countries, hard quantitative evidence on their impact is rather scarce. 
He cites two successful cases of decentralization in Latin America for service delivery 
outcomes. One is the case of participatory budgeting in municipal government in Porto 
Alegre in Brazil, and another is the post 1994 decentralization initiatives in Bolivia. 
According to the first study, Porto Alegre has impressive results following assembly 
meetings of local citizens and neighboring associations in different regions where they 
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discuss investment priorities, review accounts and allocate available resources across 
wards. Between 1998 and 1996, access to basic sanitation as well as enrolment in 
elementary and secondary schools nearly doubled, while revenue collection increased 
by 48 %. And in Bolivia, in 1994, the number of municipalities, as well as the share of 
national tax revenue allocated to municipalities, doubled, along with devolution to the 
municipalities of administrative authority, investment responsibility and title to local 
infrastructural facilities.  
Jutting et al’s (2004) research in 19 developing countries  shows that decentralization 
had negative or somewhat negative effects on the two third of these countries. While 
only one third of these countries showed some positive signs on improved 
developments after decentralization. The successful cases include, Bolivia, Philippines, 
India (West Bengal), China, Ghana South Africa and Mexico; and, among the worst 
cases include, Guinea, Mozambique, Malawi, India (Andhra Pradesh), India (Madhya 
Pradesh). In countries like Bolivia, Philippines and India (West Bengal) responsiveness 
to the needs of poor was very good. Because of reduction in voicelessness overall 
participation of public increased. More indigenous people were represented although the 
gender gap was not tackled seriously. Living conditions of the poor in these countries 
improved because of overall development and good infrastructure. In countries with 
large rural population agrarian reforms were carried out which left good impacts on the 
rural poor. Decentralization according to them is successful in these countries because it 
is generally supported by the government. The government has the ability and 
willingness to carry out reforms. The literacy rate in these countries is over 80%. These 
are generally less indebted and middle or lower middle income countries. All these 
factors contributed to the successful impacts of decentralization on poverty and service 
delivery in these countries. 
On the other hand the worst cases have had no or very little impact on poverty reduction 
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of any of the decentralization programme. In these countries ‘the overriding objective of 
the decentralization programme is political stability and the maintenance of central 
control through deconcentration rather than effective devolution. …..decentralization in 
these countries is not designed for its benefits in terms of democratization, greater 
responsiveness to local needs and community participation’ (Jutting et al, 2004:16). All 
these countries are highly indebted and their infrastructure is very poor. The literacy rate 
in these countries is under 50%. 
The failure of decentralization in these countries is because they do not meet the 
conditions essential for it. The intentions behind decentralization have not been the 
economic and social development of the people but consolidating the power of the 
military or non-military dictator.  
Richard Crook (2001) asserts that though decentralization increased participation of the 
people in elections in South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda and Cote d’Ivoire but the 
responsiveness to the needs of the people on the part of officials is still very low. 
Decentralization in these countries has no impact on development and growth because 
the funding from the centre to the local government is only a fraction of the GNP. 
According to him in none of these countries, “Decentralization will empower any real 
challenge to local elites who are resistant to or uninterested in development to pro-poor 
policies, except possibly South Africa, if the regime sees a political advantage in using 
local government for this purpose. On the contrary in most of the African cases ‘elite 
capture’ of local power structures has been facilitated by the desire of ruling elites to 
create and sustain power bases in the countryside” (ibid, 2001:86). 
Van Braun and Grote (2000) find some positive impacts of decentralization in war torn 
societies like Ethiopia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Uganda and South Africa. In Ethiopia 
decentralization has played a great role in reducing the secessionist tendencies. In 
Bosnia & Herzegovina it has provided an institutionalized mechanism for bringing the 
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divided groups into a rule bound bargaining process. In Uganda and South Africa 
decentralization has paved the path for peace. In the absence of such a mechanism it 
would have been difficult to bring peace in these multi-ethnic societies where people 
belonging to one ethnic group would not trust another group to hold all the powers. This 
has also impacted on development because violence and conflicts is one of the causes 
for underdevelopment and public services. Absolute poverty expressed in terms of 
hunger is concentrated in countries affected by internal wars and conflicts. Although 
decentralization is not a panacea for bringing peace and sometimes, it may even 
exacerbate violence between two groups, but it can at least provide rule bound 
mechanism which is likely to lead to peace. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined some of the attempts to define decentralization. It also reviewed 
the development and decentralization link in the theory which showed that 
decentralization is all good for development and service delivery outcome so far as the 
theory is concerned but in practice decentralization fall short of expectations. In theory 
decentralization is regarded as improving accountability, responsiveness, participation, 
raising poor citizen’s voice, reducing corruption all leading to efficient delivery of 
public services and poverty reduction. However, the practice of decentralization in the 
developing countries is not consistent with the theoretical arguments put forward in 
support of decentralization. The successful cases show that it improved participation 
and empowerment to some extent but it has not resulted in the reduction of poverty or 
efficient delivery of public services.  
The next chapter will focus specifically on the history of decentralization in Pakistan 
with a detailed analysis of the current local government system. 
 
   22
 
Chapter 3:  Local Government system in Pakistan 
Pakistan is a country of 155 million people, estimated in 2006 (Government of Pakistan, 
2006) and has a GNP per capita of US $ 510. It was created in 1947 as a result of 
partition of united India by the British. As of today, review of the development scene 
and service delivery arrangements at the ground level point out that the quality and 
quantum of development are far from satisfactory, in substance or speed. Social 
indicators are dismal and significantly worse for women. Poverty has been rising 
through the 1990s and almost one-third of the population lives below $1 a day (Asian 
Development Bank, 2003). There is an impressive portfolio of schemes and projects, 
which have been implemented in the past decades, but they have not succeeded in 
generating a development process, i.e., activating the local community and local 
resources in a manner that they could mover forward with diminishing development 
intervention from the state in line with global trend. Pakistan’s history over the last two 
decades is story of reform postponed-both political and economic. Political history is 
marred with intermittent military rule (Leftwhich, 1993). Since independence in 1947, 
there have been four martial laws under different dispensations and three constitutions 
have been enacted (1956, 1962 and 1973). 
Historically, local governments have been existed in the Indian subcontinent for many 
centuries, with the first municipal corporation set-up in Madras in 1688 by the British 
East India Company. In Karachi, the Board of Conservancy was established in 1846. 
After creation of Pakistan in 1947, invariably every military rule has patronized and 
introduced its own brand of grass-root democracy; present regime being no exception 
(See Table I), situation of LG during political interregnum is reflected in Table II. 
Surprisingly, LGs performed far better under the military rulers than they have 
otherwise. It is also interesting to note that a large number of those who have been 
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elected as members of the national and provincial assemblies began their political 
careers in local politics. Shah, Anwar (1997:10) describes why the social structures in 
Pakistan are loaded against decentralization. According to him political instability and 
feudal interest have always worked against decentralization. Military rulers and feudal 
influence in the intervening periods favored centralized systems. Central government 
weakened local government by channeling development funds through members of 
parliament and at times simply disband local government institutions. 
Table I                
Martial Laws /Military Rule 
Tenure No. of 
years 
Leaders LG brand Distinguishing feature 
1958   
to   
1969 
11 Gen. Ayub 
Khan 
Basic 
Democracy 
(BD) 
BD system substituted 
universal suffrage as it served 
as an electoral college for the 
election of the President.  
1977 
 to 
1988 
11 General 
Ziaul Haq 
No specific 
brand  
LGs revived under provincial 
laws. 3-4 successful terms 
completed under this system. 
1999 
 till 
date 
7 General 
Pervez 
Musharaf  
Devolution of 
Power 
Based on the principle of 
subsidiary. Radical departure 
from all previous system. 
Launched in pursuance of 
Structural Adjustment 
Programme of donors and 
resuscitate collapsing services 
delivery system. Devolution 
accompanied by taxation, civil 
services and police reforms.   
Here, it is interesting to note that India, by 1959, all States had not only passed 
Panchayat Acts, but also set up panchayats over most parts (Jain, 1985). Jain (1985) 
   24
 
however indicates that there was lack of interest in problems of common welfare of the 
villagers.  
Table-II 
Political Interregnum 
 
Tenure Political Situation Remarks 
1947-
1958 
No constitution, no elected 
government  
Urban Councils and Districts Boards in 
rural areas continued according to law 
left by the British Govt. 
1971-
1976 
First elected national /provincial
government 
Despite promulgation of LG law, no 
elections held for LGs, throughout this 
period local bodies were managed 
through official administrators. 
1988-
1999 
Several elected political 
governments remained in power.
All elected LGs dismissed. New LG 
elections never held though announced 
and scheduled several time elections 
were held in certain provinces in 1988, 
but representatives never assumed 
office.   
 
3.1  The New Local Government System 
In Pakistan, like any other developing country, problems have aggravated as a result of 
heavy concentration of powers by the federal and provincial governments in the matter 
of public services and infrastructure development. There was little coordination between 
different offices at the district level, and secondly, all important aspects of public 
service delivery were under bureaucratic control without any contribution from elected 
politicians at the local level or members of the public. Elected bodies controlled few and 
relatively less important aspects of public service delivery. Due to the nature of the 
system, the provincial and central government did the policy making and district 
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authorities acted as the implementation staff with little say in decision making. The 
crisis of confidence in government led to alienation and low levels of citizens’ 
participation, creating a vicious cycle of even more top-down and less responsive 
government. Coupled with these facts, weak administrative capacity and lack of 
resources had seriously hampered service delivery capabilities. Precisely, Building the 
institutions for a capable public sector is essential to enhancing state effectiveness, but 
also immensely difficult. Once poor systems are in place, they can be very difficult to 
dislodge. Strong interests develop in maintaining the states quo, however inefficient or 
unfair (The World Bank, 1997:79). With these classical symptoms rampant in the 
country, the Government of Pakistan launched its programme of “Devolution of Power 
and Authority” under the aegis of National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB). This 
dedicated department was established in Chief Executive’s Secretariat. The NRB 
presented the new local government system after a hectic process of consultation and 
deliberations with in a short period of about twenty months. Thus the new system was 
made effective with effect from 14th August 2001, the 54th birthday of Pakistan.  
For the past six years a radical program of reforms in local governments has been 
underway in Pakistan. It was first outlined in the 2000 Devolution Plan2, and then 
promulgated in the 2001 Local Government Ordinances (LGO 2001). The reforms 
relate to devolution of power to the lower tiers of the local governments. The devolution 
plan and local government ordinances brought about a wholesale transformation in 
Pakistan's system of government, especially at the local level. A three-tier local 
government structure comprising of three categories of local government at districts, 
tehsils3 and unions4 was brought in. The new system is based on the principle of 
subsidiary involving devolution of power from provinces to districts and other lower 
                                            
2 The plan introduced by the regime of President Musharraf for decentralization of local governments. 
3 A local government area or jurisdictional unit. 
4 A local government area or constituency unit. 
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levels.  Union government (lowest rung), Town or Taluka/Tehsil government 
(intermediary tier) and district government are in place. All provincial capitals have city 
districts governments. An elected Nazim (mayor) now runs each district with the 
support of district officials. Although many details still need to be worked out, this is 
one of the most fundamental changes in governance in Pakistan since independence in 
1947. 
A key aim of the programme is to improve delivery of public service to citizens and 
improve current unacceptable performance on key social and poverty indicators. The 
local government reform represents a bold attempt to empower the citizens of Pakistan 
and transform an over centralized and ineffective service delivery system into a 
decentralized, responsive and accountable one. Most of the district nazims come from 
prominent political or business families but many of the councillors are new to politics 
and one-third of the councillors are women, facts indicating towards social change! 
(Bari, 2001). Under the new system, district government have taken responsibility for 
Agriculture, Health, Education, Community Development, Information Technology, 
Finance and Planning and Revenue from the provinces and are now financially 
competent in relation to financially transferred funds and local taxes (National 
Reconstruction Bureau, 2001). Town /taluka government have taken over some of the 
functions of the former municipal authorities. (e.g., in relation to water, sanitation, roads 
and waste disposal) and are financially competent for their share of property tax and 
general sales tax (GST), and the local taxes. The union councils are the main focus of 
monitoring and oversight of service delivery as well as undertaking small 
developmental projects. Union councils receive funds directly from the district and 
collect some local taxes. Features introduced for the first time in the history of Pakistan 
are cited below point wise in Table III: 
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Table-III 
Voters age reduced from 21 to 18 years to bring youth into main stream politics.  
Minimum educational qualification prescribed for the Nazims (Mayor) to bring in 
more educated people at elected slots. 
Manifesto mandatory for candidates of District and Town / Taluka Nazims 
(Mayors). 
Training made mandatory for elected representatives. 
 A. Electoral 
Elections conducted by central Election Commission of Pakistan instead of 
provincial election authorities, to ensure better transparently and fair free conduct 
of elections. 
Local government election held in phases for better management and coordination.  
Seats for women enhanced to 33% in all tiers of LG. 
Divisional tier (between districts and provincial government) abolished. 
Office of the Deputy Commissioner abolished and replaced by senior District 
Coordination Officer (DCO) reporting to Nazim (mayor). Interaction of DCO with 
provincial government through mayor. 
Magistracy abolished. 
Mayor made chief executive of respective local government with wide ranging 
administrative and financial powers. 
B. General 
Elaborate mechanism for internal and external recall of elected representatives 
prescribed under the law. Similarly, officials enabled to seek recourse against 
motivated or illegal order of Nazims.  
C. Finance Provincial Finance Commission constituted for allocation of resources from 
provinces to districts, based on population, fiscal capacity, fiscal effort and specific 
needs, etc. of districts. 
Police Act of 1861 replaced after nearly 150 years. Law and order is made 
responsibility of Zila Nazim (District Mayor), but District Police Chief is 
responsible to his own professional hierarchy in matters of crime prevention, 
investigation and personnel management of force. This arrangement checks 
patronage by political leadership and highhandedness of police while facilitating 
dispensation of justice.   
District Public Safety Commission constituted, comprising of elected and non-
elected members. The commission acts as a safety valve providing recourse to both 
police officer and mayor, in case of motivated action or order on part of either party.
B. Police 
Police Complaint Authority is introduced to deal with serious complaints against 
police. 
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3.2 Citizens Community Boards (CCB) 
Understanding the need of local participation in development activities the new local 
government system provides for establishing CCBs to ensure the participation of local 
community. These are voluntary, non-profit associations of local people who mobilize 
local people to participate in development and non-development activities. Community 
participation in local government is very important to ensure that planning and 
development are carried out in accordance with the local need and to monitor service 
delivery and promote transparency and accountability.  
These Boards performs functions like identify development and municipal needs and 
mobilize resources; develop, manage and maintain public facilities, help the 
handicapped, destitute, widows and families in extreme poverty; and form stakeholder 
associations like parent-teacher associations and patient-hospitals associations. 25% of 
the local government funds are reserved for CCBs while they have to raise 20% of 
funds for a project themselves (DSP, 2003). 
3.3  Local Government Finance 
The new local government system envisages formula-based fiscal transfers to the 
districts through Provincial Finance Awards. It is a development grant to each District 
on the recommendations of the Provincial Finance Commission (based on the principles 
of fiscal need, fiscal capacity, fiscal effort and performance) established for the purpose 
(Charlton et al, 2002). The Minister for Finance of the Provincial Government heads the 
commission with Secretary Local Government, Secretary Finance and Secretary 
Planning and Development as its members. One District Nazim, one Tehsil Nazim and 
one Union Nazim along with three professional members from the private sector are 
also its members. 
In addition to the grant from the provincial government, local governments are allowed 
to levy local taxes from a specified list given in the LGO (2001). While the local 
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governments are allowed to tax for some services, they are still dependent to a large 
extent on the transfers from the provincial government which make them dependent on 
the provinces. The baseline assessment made on the eve of promulgation of LGO 
(2001), was assessed as at more than 95 % for district governments and ranged from 50 
% to around 90 % for TMAs in 2001, in various provinces5 were dependent on the 
provinces for funding. But the formula based awards under PFC seem to balance the 
effects of this dependence to make the districts operate independently of the provinces.  
                                            
5 Cyan, Musharaf (2001), cited in ‘Devolution in Pakistan’ Annex 1—Recent History (2004) 
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Chapter 4:  Impact of new local government system on 
service delivery  
Local government reforms were intended to bring about core structural changes in the 
administrative machinery of the government. They included separation of powers, 
relocation of functions, bringing the state closer to citizens, and bridging the gap 
between central government and local population. Devolution in Pakistan is meant to 
bring justice to the doorstep and improve the performance of the local administrations, 
courts, and police. It was aimed that basic human rights would be better recognized and 
protected under devolution (Cyan and Porter 2004). The most imperative reason 
presented by the government for the implementation of these reforms was to devolve 
the decision making powers to the grass root levels of civil society. However, positive 
impacts of these reforms on the public service delivery may take some time to 
substantiate.  
Cheema et al (2005) had presented the new lines of task, jurisdictional demarcation and 
transfers of functional and authoritative responsibilities into the lower tiers of 
government. Administration of teaching hospitals, agricultural research and 
development, supervision of foreign funded projects, and regulation of medical 
standards have remained at the provincial level even after the devolution of other 
activities in these departments. Certain budgetary heads of expenditures have effectively 
been retained at the provincial level e.g. salary and allowance expenditures of all 
department employees.  
Primary health care and management of district and Tehsil hospitals, assessment and 
collection of land taxes, agricultural income tax, agricultural extension and farm water 
management, planning and design of district roads and buildings are now devolved to 
the district governments from the province. Services such as the establishment of new 
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schools, up gradation of existing schools, and the maintenance and inspection of schools 
that were under control of provincial government are now the responsibility of the 
district governments. Services provided by the provincial local government department, 
housing department, urban development, and (PHED) public health engineering 
department have been devolved from the provincial to the tehsil level. Key municipal 
services such as water supply, sewerage, sanitation, drainage schemes and street lights 
have also been devolved. 
The new system of local government is in place since 2001. Statistical data from various 
sources is analyzed to determine the trends in the sectors like health, education, water 
and sanitation, and police and justice. This chapter would give a broader view of public 
services analysis. Based on field visits to three districts of Pakistan Williamson et al 
(2005) studied improvements in post devolution social service deliveries, visiting 
primary schools, BHUs (Basic Health Unit), and water supply schemes. Special 
reference is given to this study in this chapter. Following are the findings of this 
research on key sectors of public services. 
4.1  Health 
The administration of health sector which was previously managed by the provincial 
health department has largely been devolved to the district level. The position of 
Executive District Officer Health (EDO-H) has been created and is filled in all districts. 
All the health facilities, including district headquarters hospitals, except teaching 
hospitals, have been placed under this office. The teaching hospitals have been given 
autonomy although still operating under provincial control. EDO health reports to 
District Coordination Officer (DCO) who reports to District Nazim (Mayor) which 
makes them indirectly accountable to the public. 
Early indications show that there are some improvements in the delivery of health 
services. Statistics provided by Federal Bureau of Statistics show an increase in the 
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access to health facilities in 2004 as compared to figures in 2001. 77% of households 
had access to health facilities according to the survey conducted in 2004 as against 67% 
in 2001 when the process of devolution was started (Pakistan Social and Living 
Standards Measurement Survey, PSLSM, 2004-05 figure-2). But the same survey shows 
that although access to health facilities has increased, satisfaction of the people 
regarding health facilities have decreased. 24% of the households were satisfied with 
the health facilities in 2004 as against to 27% in 2001 (ibid, 2004-05). This shows that 
the government has only focused on increasing the number of health facilities such as 
Basic Health Units (BHU) and Rural Health Centers (RHC) while ignoring the most 
important aspect such as staff absenteeism, poor motivation and staff attitude with the 
public.  In a study conducted by Williamson et al (2005) reported that 12% of people 
in urban localities cited the lack of staff courtesy as their reason for not seeking medical 
attention at a government health facility. This has affected the overall use of government 
health facility which has fallen from 32% to 26% between 2001 and 2004 in Pakistan 
(Cockcroft et al, 2004-05).  
(Figure 2) percentage of households with access to government health services  
(Figure:2)                                          Source: PSLM 2004-05 
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Staff absenteeism and poor motivation is the biggest obstacle in the delivery of social 
services. Williamson et al (2005) reported that in a visit to local BHU in Abbottabad6 
district, their team found that only chowkidar (security guard) was present at the facility. 
A doctor had not been posted there in 10 years while rest of the staff remained absent 
while receiving their salaries. There is no organized mechanism to keep check over staff 
attendance. While LGO (2001) provides for the establishment of monitoring committees, 
only few districts have formed these committees which are ineffective in tackling this 
problem as they do not have any powers of firing or rewarding the staff. The powers of 
appointment, postings and transfers (APT) have not been devolved to the districts and 
are retained by the Provincial Government. Lacking these powers the people’s 
representatives have little incentives to make front line staff accountable to them.   
The government of Pakistan has increased the allocation of funds to health sector. 
Overall health spending was 7 % of total national spending in the year 2003-04 which 
was 40% higher than the previous year spending (GoP, 2005), but this is still very low 
as compared to a poor country like Uganda, with half the per capita income to that of 
Pakistan, which provides higher funding to health than Pakistan. The per capita 
spending, according to Williamson et al (2005), in the district Abbotabad and Dera 
Ismail Khan was Pak Rs. 4 as compared to Pak Rs. 40 (in equivalent currency) in 
Uganda. The low spending in the health sector has made it difficult to maintain quality 
standards in the health facilities. Fed up with the low standard and high cost of 
medicines in government facilities people are generally inclined to approach private 
practitioners who are usually unqualified. Pakistan saw an increase in the use of private 
unqualified practitioner which rose to 22% in 2004 as compare to 13% in 2001 
                                            
6 A district in NWFP Province  
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(Cockcroft et al, 2004-05). Lack of medicines, distance of the health facilities and high 
cost of medicines are cited as the main reasons why the number of people using 
government facilities has declined (ibid, 2004-05).  
The procurement process for obtaining medicines is still carried out by the provincial 
government, which often delays medicine procurement until after the end of the first 
quarter and sometimes as late as the end of the second quarter of the financial year. 
Thus, even though, district governments have the legal and institutional authority to 
provide various health services, their ability to effectively manage these services is 
constrained by the provincial bureaucracy’s administrative control over district staff 
(Nayyar-Stone et al, 2006). Districts’ own source of revenue is very narrow and funding 
for the health services are provided by the provincial government. The user fees that the 
districts collect are deposited in the provincial government account which is distributed 
by the province according to Provincial Finance Commission (PFC) award’s formula 
and not according to the actual amount collected in each district. Thus the district 
government has been left to rely on provincial government in every aspect.  
It was found by ADB/DFID/World Bank post devolution study (2004) that some health 
committee in Karachi claimed to have both increased the attendance of staff by 20% and 
improved the quality of maintenance and repair. This claim was generally verified by 
NGOs and journalists. Similarly, the city health committee stated that it had visited 25 
hospitals in the last year to oversee the quality of service and reduce absenteeism. The 
committee members believe that this improvement has been achieved because of their 
consistent monitoring. Reports are common that doctors are more often present in health 
facilities and teachers in schools as compared to the case before devolution. The 
increasing availability of staff can lead to the increased chances that local facilities, 
particularly for health, will actually have medicines available for the treatment. With the 
full devolution of procurement, public medical facilities are now well stocked and 
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therefore more used. But such exceptions are seldom observed and in many cases, 
restricted to some large cities. 
ADB/DFID/World Bank (2004) mentions a case about user fees in health. In Killa 
Saifullah and Karachi districts, no OPD (Out Patient Department) fee was charged, but 
other receipts were deposited into the provincial account. In Bannu and Bahawalpur 
districts, the OPD fee and other user charges were deposited into the provincial account. 
In Khairpur, by contrast, OPD fees are collected and deposited in a joint account of the 
facility and Naib Nazim7 of the union council concerned to be spent on small day to 
day requirements of the facility. In Faisalabad, OPD fee and other receipts do benefit the 
district as they are deposited in district account.  
Concluding the above discussion post decentralization health sector facilities has not 
been able to show improvement except for some nominal variations in urban areas. 
Rural areas which are in desperate need of benefits of these reforms are still deprived of 
their basic provisions. Statistics clearly show the imbalanced approaches in this regard. 
The rural urban division remains completely enacted in practice if not in policy and 
records.   
4.2 Education 
Under the new local government system education has largely been devolved to the 
district and tehsil (sub-district) level. The districts are now responsible for primary, 
secondary and higher secondary education. The head of the education department at the 
district level is Executive District Officer (EDO) education assisted by District Officer 
(DDO) and Assistant District Officer (ADO). The devolution has led to a decrease in the 
total number of senior education staff. Previously there were four District Education 
Officers (two for boys’ and girls’ primary schools and two for boys’ and girls’ secondary 
                                            
7 Deputy Mayor 
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schools) who had equal powers and authority to monitor schools. Now there are only 
three: the EDO-E and DO (male) and DO (female). The district government can recruit 
school teachers upto BPS-16 (Basic Pay Scale) and below but the authority over 
staffing-hiring, firing, and transfers for BPS-17 and above remains with the provincial 
government. Thus, even though district governments have the legal and institutional 
authority to provide educational services, their ability to effectively manage service 
provision in the sector is constrained by the provinces’ administrative control over 
district staff (Nayyar-Stone et al, 2006).  
The provincial and the district governments after the decentralization have undertaken a 
wide variety of reforms in the education sector for achieving long term economic 
development and poverty alleviation. Under the new system of local government, SMCs 
(School Management Committees) have started functioning. Head teachers have the 
influence in most of the cases and they select members. ADB/DFID/World Bank (2004) 
mentions that in many districts of Sindh, Union Nazims (Mayor) were serving as 
chairpersons of SMCs, In some cases, active encouragement of SMCs by district or 
union Nazim (mayor) have resulted in significant improvements in school quality. 
Khairpur is amongst the most innovative districts in terms of community involvement in 
service delivery. SMCs, with the help of union councils, have been given the 
responsibility to construct schools. Not only 35 schools have been completed, but with 
community monitoring, their construction cost was around Rs.200,000-250,000, 
compared to approximately Rs.780,000 for similar ones previously built by the 
Education department. 
Audit of social service delivery in Pakistan by Cockcroft et al (2005) found that net 
school enrolment (in any school or grade) among children aged 5-9 years increased 
from 70% in 2002 to 77% in 2004. Out of all 5-9 year old children in 2004, 43% were 
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enrolled in government schools, 30% in private schools, 3% in Madaris8 and 1% in 
non-formal schools. Between 2002 and 2004, there was a 2% increase in enrolment into 
government schools and a 3% increase in enrolment into private schools. The 
percentage of enrolled children in government schools fell because of the greater 
increase in enrolment into private schools. Two reasons which parents gave for sending 
a child to a government school were ease of access and the low cost incentives. In 2004, 
73% of parents of children in a government school were satisfied with the school, 
compared with 91% for children in a private school. 
The government’s action plan for education sector reforms has set a goal of raising NPE 
(Net primary enrolment) from 66% in 2001 to 76% in 2004 (Ministry of Education, GoP 
2002). According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics, GoP (2002), the 
figure for NPE in 2001 was 66%. PIHS (Pakistan Integrated Household Survey) from 
the 1990s depicts that overall enrolments were low and they exhibited persistent, large 
gender, urban-rural, and rich-poor gaps. Primary gross enrolment rates among the top 3 
deciles, by per capita consumption, were around 90%, whereas that among the bottom 3 
deciles was around 50%. Similarly, in Sindh only 25 percent of girls living in rural areas 
were enrolled in primary school, compared to 62 percent in its urban areas (Keefer et al 
2005). UNICEF’s NPE figure for Pakistan during the period 1996-2003 is 56% i.e. 62% 
male and 51% female (Cockcroft et al 2005). The Pakistan Social and Living Standards 
Measurement Survey (PSLSM) (2004-05) had recently reported a NPE figure of 52% 
(Federal Bureau of Statistics 2005). 
From the preceding discussion its obvious that the education indicators in the country 
are still relatively low. The main reasons for these low indicators are said to be 
inadequate financial resources; physical inaccessibility of many areas; poorly trained 
                                            
8 Plural of Madrasa, a religious (Muslim) education institute. 
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and ill paid teachers; inadequate supply of instructional materials and poor physical 
facilities in schools; weak institutional capacity and lack of community involvement in 
the affairs of the school (MoE, 2005). The total literacy rate which was 44% in 2001 has 
improved considerably but is still marked by a high gender gap. In a survey carried out 
by National Reconstruction Bureau (2002), the most common reason given by parents 
for not sending their children to school was their inability to afford the cost of schooling.  
4.3 Water and Sanitation 
Access to water and sanitation services has improved after the enactment of the new 
local government system, although, it cannot be ascertained how far the decentralization 
has contributed in the improvement of these services. Over 70 % of the household in 
Pakistan had access to government water supply in 2004 as compare to only 46 % in 
2002 (Cockcroft et al, 2004-05). While in rural areas the situation is not as good as in 
urban areas where a high number of 46 % still do not have access to potable water 
supply (Williamson et al, 2005). Unlike education and health sector not only has access 
to the services in water and sanitation improved but the satisfaction with the services 
also increased. Over 30 % of people expressed their satisfaction with water and 
sanitation services in 2004 as against 27 % in 2002 (Cockcroft et al, 2004- 05). 
Satisfaction with services in this sector has largely been the result of development 
programmes like Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (RWSSP), School 
Sanitation Programme (SSP), and Water Quality Assessment (WQS) programme, 
assisted and funded by ADB, DFID and UNICEF. ADB along with DFID is also 
working in collaboration with Government of Pakistan on the institutional capacity 
building in the districts to help strengthen local institutions to manage these schemes by 
themselves (Ahmed, 2006).  
Provincial Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) was mainly responsible for 
the development and maintenance of water and sanitation services, specifically for large 
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projects in rural areas. Development Authorities (DAs) and Water and Sanitation 
Authority (WASA) were providing similar services in large, urban centers. 
ADB/DFID/World Bank (2004) reported that although according to the government 
sources water and sanitation are now clearly assigned to Tehsils or towns, the situation 
of arrangements reveals the incompetence of provincial control. Each province has 
devolved PHED in a different way. The pre-devolution structure of the department was 
the same in all four provinces. In NWFP, PHED had initially been devolved to the 
district and not to TMA level, but was subsequently recentralized to the division or 
circle level. Sindh and Punjab were good examples of implementation of the LGO, but 
even there, it was mostly the provincial control. Progress of decentralized government 
can hardly be judged in a fair manner as most of the management still remains out of 
local government‘s control.      
Despite improvements in water and sanitation services the contribution of local 
governments in the improvement of water and sanitation services have been marginal. 
Tehsil Management Administrations (TMAs), who are responsible for water and 
sanitation services in the devolved government, have often been found to have 
employed a barrage of staff adding to the already high water production costs. 
Williamson et al (2005) report that Dera Ismail Khan water supply system has a staff of 
28, operating its 417 connections compared to the international benchmark of 5 staff 
members for that number of connections. This over staffing is the result of politics of 
patronage where local as well politicians at the national level are involved in providing 
individual benefits to make their own vote bank. TMAs have also been found to be 
reluctant in collecting water bills regularly because of the high political cost of cutting 
off water supply to defaulters (ibid, 2005). TMAs are often unable to pay their 
electricity costs which accumulate over the years in arrears. These are often covered by 
mainstream TMA revenues in urban areas which results in shrinking the already short 
   40
 
funds available to be spent on development. In rural areas the schemes maintained by 
Village Development Organizations (VDO) often do not have funds to cover the costs 
and are left disuse. (Figure 3 shows high cost of electricity in Dera Ismail Khan).    
Figure: 3 Low Revenues and High Expenditure in Dera Ismail Khan's Water 
Supply Scheme 
 
(Source: DI Khan District Local Government (2004) ' Budget for the year 2004/05, 
Cited in Williamson et al, 2005) 
The rationale of decentralizing water and sanitation services was to involve community 
in initiation and maintenance of projects in this sector. The local people still have very 
little say in the projects initiated by local governments apart from the projects funded by 
ADB and DFID. In some schemes the communities are expected to contribute 20 % to 
30 % of the costs and to take full responsibility of Management and Operations (Ahmed, 
2006).  Looking at the poor conditions of the people where they are even unable to pay 
for the high bills, 20 % direct contribution to the project is a big amount to be expected 
from local communities.  
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4.4  Police and Justice 
One major reform of the new local government system was the abolishment of the 
office of deputy commissioner and the division of these powers in to the offices of the 
district and session judge, district Nazim, the DCO, and District Police Officer (DPO)9 
This is argued to be a contribution towards the independence of the judiciary by taking 
away special and discretionary powers from the executive. 
Under the new decentralized system, the accountability of the police has now been 
reworked through new structures of District Public Safety Commission, Police 
Complaints Authorities, and the judiciary. However, some critics of the new system 
think that under the new system police have been given even more powers than they 
previously had and more opportunities to escape accountability (ADB/DFID/WB, 2004).  
The District Police Officer (DPO) is not responsible to any executive head in the district. 
And District Nazim has only some limited oversight functions over the police. The 
powers of the Nazim to write annual confidential report (ACR) of the police have not 
been used in any district. Either the Nazims do not know of these powers or even if they 
know, these are largely ineffective as the reports are to be countersigned by the 
provincial police officer and Chief Minister.  
Survey carried out by Cockcroft et al (2005) report satisfaction with police as 52 % in 
Pakistan. In NWFP in 2004 satisfaction with the police services remained unchanged at 
40 % both in 2002 and 2004. This could probably the reason for a drop in the number of 
people who contacted police. Some 54 % people reported contact with police in NWFP 
2004 as against 57 % in 2002 (Cockcroft et al, 2005). Corruption is reported to have 
                                            
9 Whereas the district police have been made responsible to the District Nazim under the Police Order 
2002, the investigative, prosecution and administrative functions of the district police do not fall under the 
purview of the district government. 
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risen in the police department after the separation of investigation and 'watch and ward' 
functions of police as the public is required to cut a deal with two sets of police officers 
(ADB/DFID/WB, 2004). It is also reported that the officers in the investigation wing are 
comparatively incompetent and have no specialist skills because the low budget 
allocated to this wing has made it relatively less attractive for the police officers who 
are reluctant to be posted to that wing (ibid, 2004). 
The judiciary has now been completely separated from the executive. Before devolution 
executive members like Deputy Commissioners (DC) and Assistant Commissioners 
(AC) had the powers of executive magistrates at the district level. These powers have 
now been taken from them and given to the District Session Judges (DSJs). The initial 
impact of such separation was the overburdening of courts with petty cases that used to 
be decided by Executive Magistrates. But with the introduction of alternative court 
resolutions, like resolving petty civil issues by the union council members, has reduced 
delays in the dispensation of justice.   
The District Session Judges (DSJs) have now been empowered with powers like calling 
for and inspect the daily diary of a police station to ensure compliance with the law 
under Art. 167(2), of the Police Order (2002). DSJs have also to Act ex officio in their 
respective districts as Chairperson of a seven-member District Criminal Justice 
Coordination Committee, the meetings of which are required to take place at least once 
a month (Article 111(2)). All High Courts have now established Member Inspection 
Team (MIT) to look at the complaints and corruption in Judiciary at lower level. While 
MIT is generally not known to the public, the LGO seeks to encourage access to the 
MIT by establishing district and tehsil insaaf committees whose function it is to help 
citizens pursue complaints about the functioning of subordinate courts. Unfortunately 
such committees have not been established in many of the districts (ADB/DFID/WB, 
2004). LGO (2001) also provides for Citizens-Court Liaison committees but these 
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committees are not functioning at the moment.   
Although the perception of the people that the courts are there to help them increased 
from 48 % in 2002 to 62 % in 2004, the households contact with the court declined 
from 6 % in 2002 to 5 % in 2004 (Cockcroft et al, 2004-05). The decline shows less 
confidence of the people of the resolution of disputes by courts. Another reason for the 
decline is an increase in the number of people who used the alternative mechanism of 
Union Council to resolve their problems. The PSLSM Survey (2004-05) reported that, 
in response to a single question on satisfaction with the police, only 6.5% of households 
said they were satisfied with police services (Federal Bureau of Statistics, 2005). 
Similarly Cockcroft et al (2005) found out that in 2004, in response to an open question 
about who they would contact for a problem of personal safety, 25% of household 
respondents mentioned the police.  
4.5 Poverty Reduction 
Although there is no evidence of a direct link between decentralization and poverty 
reduction but it is believed that decentralized government can provide space for people 
to participate in local development; it can ensure a more efficient allocation of resources 
(including development aid), enhance local resource mobilization and improve local 
governance. This, in turn, may pave the way for more effective poverty reduction 
strategies (Bossuyt and Gould, 2000).  
Decentralization does have positive impacts on poverty reduction. Asante (2003:2) has 
asserted that the virtues of decentralization such as democracy, popular participation, 
responsiveness, accountability and equity have led to the belief that decentralization will 
lead to greater responsiveness to the poor. 
In a participatory poverty assessment study (2003), poverty and vulnerability in 
Pakistan were identified with illiteracy, inadequate access to goods and public services, 
social exclusion and stigma, remoteness and physical isolation, and insecurity and lack 
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of peace, among others. It was hoped that with decentralizing power and authority to the 
local level many of the above causes of poverty would disappear thereby bring 
reduction in the level of poverty. The above analysis shows that although in Pakistan the 
number of people with access to these facilities has increased, the quality of services has 
not improved. The problem of poverty mostly remains intact and addressing the issue 
will need more sincere and continuous efforts on the part of policy-makers.  
4.6 Factors Hampering Efficient Delivery of Services 
Jutting et al (2004) argues that decentralization is successful in the countries like 
Bolivia, Philippines, India (West Bengal), China, Ghana, South Africa and Mexico 
because the government has the ability and willingness to carry out reforms. The 
literacy rate in these countries is over 80%. These are generally less indebted and 
middle or lower middle income countries. All these factors contributed to the successful 
impacts of decentralization on service delivery in these countries. 
Pakistan lags behind the international standards laid down for effective decentralization 
of authority and resources. The ability and the willingness, on the part of the 
government are somewhat not clear because the devolution of power was introduced 
partly to legitimize military government and partly because of the pressure of the 
International Financial Institutions who have made public management reforms as a 
condition for providing aid. Devolution of power for bringing efficiency in the delivery 
of services was a secondary objective before the current military government. This lack 
of willingness and lack of ability on the part of government is hampering the process of 
devolution to deliver better services. People do not have enough information about local 
governments and their functions and the government has not made enough efforts to 
make people aware of their rights and duties under devolved government as is shown by 
the survey conducted by Williamson et al (2005:29. The greatest number of people who 
approached the Union Councilors was for financial support and less than 2 % 
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approached them in relation to health and education services. 
Education is an important factor in the success of decentralization. Government figures 
show that literacy rate in Pakistan is about 65% which also include those who can only 
write their name but do not understand many of the complexities of modern government. 
The actual rate of people who have gained education up to secondary or higher 
secondary is far below the 65%. Lack of education is particularly responsible for the 
lack of accountability of the service deliverers. Decentralization, as argued by Smith 
(1985), promotes political education at the local level. In Pakistan, people do not know 
much about local politics except polling votes at ballot boxes. This lack of education 
has contributed to the little success of decentralization in improving the delivery of 
services.  
Pakistan is one of the highly indebted and lower income countries in the world. 33 % of 
people live below poverty line. Pakistan's position on the UNDP Human Development 
Index is 138 which are among the lowest in the world (UNDP, 2002). While it is not a 
pre-requisite for the success of decentralization to be a high income country or to have 
low poverty indicators, poverty of the people does play a role in the success or failure of 
decentralization. All the successful cases studied by Jutting et al (2004) are less 
indebted and middle income countries. Poverty in this sense is hampering the impacts of 
devolution to be felt by the people. 
Fiscal decentralization is also limited and nominal because districts governments have 
the same limited tax collection authorities. Local governments are still dependant, for 
most of their expenditures, mainly on provincial and ultimately federal funds, through 
the provincial finance commission awards. They have been assigned user fees and some 
categories of taxes, the most important being urban property tax. Councils are 
increasing collections but the outcomes remain low and there has been no shift in 
overall dependence on fiscal transfers. Elected leaders are extremely hesitant to 
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significant local taxation, particularly in this infant stage.   
The provincial assembly members consider the councilors and the Nazims as their 
political competitors in the constituencies where the Nazims now control more 
resources for delivery of benefits directly to the constituents (Cyan and Porter, 2004). 
Schneider (2003) was of the opinion that poor people may be discouraged from 
organizing to secure their rights or access the benefits through decentralized systems. 
Hasnain (2005) further added that elected politicians in Pakistan appeared to be far 
more concerned with patronage, or with targeted favors to a small number of privileged 
groups, rather than on providing public goods that would benefit the majority of citizens.  
 
Figure 4: Causes and Effects: Reasons for poor quality public services 
Source: Williamson et al (2005).  
The budget constraints can also lead to unpredictability in the flow of resources to local 
governments, thus reducing their ability to plan and manage resources efficiently and 
undermining operational performance (World Bank, 1998 cited in ADB/DfID/World 
Bank, 2004). Another reason for poor performance by local government is that PFC and 
vertical programmes adversely affects the efficiency of resource allocations as it widens  
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The gap between salary and non-salary expenditures. (Figure 5)       
 
Many EDOs, TMOs and DCOs lack managerial skills required in a system where 
administrative powers have been devolved, and there appears little interaction between 
managers across sectors. This is pointed out by Williamson et al (2005)  
He argues that many EDOs who are teachers and doctors by profession, and have had 
no previous experience in managing staff and allocating budgets are now required to 
carry out such roles. It is common to find an EDO Finance and planning with a 
background unrelated to finance and planning. He also noted reasons for the approach 
of people to their Nazims. It was mainly for financial assistance, less than 2% 
approached them in relation to health and education service provision (Table -4). Public 
   
 
Figure 5: Salaries Dominate budgets in NWFP in FY 2005 
Cited in Williamson et al (2005) 
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perception is that politicians implement development schemes such as roads, water 
points or electricity etc. 
(Table: 4) 
 
4.7 Service delivery and Jurisdictional constraints 
The most frequently discussed issue in the recent devolution reforms in Pakistan is the 
problem of jurisdictional overlap between different tiers of government and bureaucracy 
(Federal and provincial government’s employees). The public can not assess a particular 
service provided by a particular politician or level of government when many levels of 
government are involved in delivering the same services. According to the 
ADB/DFID/World Bank (2004), the overlap thus weakens incentives to perform well on 
service delivery and encourages politicians to target services to their core supporters. 
Jurisdictional overlap is particularly an issue in the education and health sectors. Federal 
 
 
Table 4: Reasons for approaching Union Councilors   
Cited in Williamson et al (2005) 
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and provincial vertical programs in those fields are still the main decision makers in 
promoting national policy priorities and hold sway in local government expenditures on 
service delivery. 
Since the provincial government remains the EDOs employer, it holds APT powers over 
them. This is highly politicized arrangement to influence transfers in the district. By the 
threat of unpleasant transfer, or the promise of an attractive one, the senior staff 
members can be under the pressure to agree to the transfer of the junior staff (Word 
Bank, 2004). Senior District managers are employed by the provincial government 
therefore they are bound to the provincial orders. There is a common complaint by the 
councilors that local government managers are not responsive to their concerns. Hassan 
(2002) argues that the provincial supporting authorities tend to keep a tight control both 
on authority and resources of the Local Governments and the Federal Government and 
the Federal political authorities have the same approach towards provinces.  
Nazim’s control the over local police head is still very vague. The ability of local 
governments to implement local and special regulations has been affected because there 
are no procedural details and because of the vertical relationship of the police chief with 
his departmental hierarchy stand in the way of implementing the new arrangements 
under the Police Order. Jurisdictional demarcation is also required in health and 
education sector, absence of which would ultimately deteriorate the relationship 
between the service providers and the citizens as well as between the policy makers and 
the service providers.  
Concerned by political interests, district staff transfers with in and across the districts 
were considered to be the main reasons of conflict between provincial and local 
governments (ADB/DFID/World Bank 2004). Study explains that the relationship 
between the district nazim and the senior staff in the district, particularly the DCO and 
DPO, can be mostly vulnerable. Nazimeen have very little effective authority over these 
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staff as writing the Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) of DCOs is just a nominal 
mechanism for enforcing accountability. Tehsil level managers possess greater control 
over preparing salary budgets and over local personnel, their recruitment and transfer. 
However, in the districts, it’s the other way round. District officials, have weak control 
over staff numbers. They cannot, on their own, decide their salary budgets or sack the 
extra staff and can only recruit within instructions given by the provinces. Formulation 
of pay policy is neither in district nor tehsil authorities’ jurisdiction.  
 
The above discussion concludes that there are serious loopholes present in the new local 
government system with reference to the jurisdictional limitations of each tier of local 
government.   
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Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
In this study several questions were investigated regarding the development impacts of 
new local government system in Pakistan with a particular on service delivery. Though 
the initial results and analyses of the new system is not encouraging yet it is hoped that 
current reforms is a step in the right direction.  
Decentralization has not been fully implemented as it is found in the LGO (2001). Many 
of the institutions and monitoring committees like Parent Teachers Associations (PTA), 
Citizen-Police liaison committees etc. that the LGO (2001) provide for have either not 
been formed or ineffective in performing their functions. In districts where these 
committees are operating it is generally found that their members are unaware of their 
functions and responsibilities. Lack of capacity at the local level is the biggest problem 
facing decentralization in Pakistan. The decentralization plan was implemented before 
the requisite capacity being developed for it at the local level.  
Discrepancies can be found in administrative, political and fiscal decentralization. In the 
areas where political and administrative authority is devolved fiscal authority has been 
held by the Provincial government which enables the provincial government to exercise 
significant control over both local administration and local finances. Fiscal 
decentralization to the local level is limited and nominal because district governments 
still have the same conventional limited tax collection authorities and spending remains 
at the whim of provincial government. Politicians are more concerned with patronage 
and consolidating their vote bank with help of targeted favors to privileged groups 
rather than providing public goods and services that would benefit majority of the 
citizens.  
One of the underlying reasons for devolving authority to the local level was to make the 
decision-makers and service providers more accountable to public. The accountability 
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of the service providers to the elected representatives and of the representatives to the 
public is not working as envisaged by LGO (2001). While in theory the officials at the 
local level are responsible to the elected representatives, they can easily escape this 
accountability because the elected representatives do not have the powers of 
appointment, postings and transfers of the officials working at the district level. These 
officials consider themselves to be the employees of provincial government and not the 
district government.  
Different tiers of government and government functionaries are involved in delivering 
the same services. Credit or blame can not be assigned to any of them and they have this 
advantage of pointing their fingers towards each other when things go wrong and 
unfortunately this happens quite often. Bureaucrats are employed by the provincial 
government; naturally they are bound to the provincial instructions and provincial 
governments being their employer, holds APT powers over them. The senior staff 
members can be under the provincial pressure to comply with the transfer instructions 
of the subordinate staff. Provincial authorities try to keep a tight control on authority 
and resources of the Local Governments. Federal Political Authorities have the same 
approach towards provinces. Nazim’s/Mayor control the over the EDOs and local police 
head is insignificant. 
A more lenient examination of decentralization reforms may come up with somewhat 
encouraging picture, specifically when the ‘infancy’ factor is brought under the 
consideration. As stated in the first chapter, this is not to say that the new system is 
absolutely futile. Notwithstanding all the flaws explicated in the analysis, the new 
system shows great signs of hope for better prospects. High level of engagement of the 
public with the new local governments, especially the union councils, is encouraging.  
Services from Tehsils i.e. the middle tier in particular seem to be doing well. There is a 
continuing increase in net school enrolment among 5-9 year old children. While the 
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increase since 2002 is more into private schools, government schools are apparently 
catering more for girls and children from vulnerable households. There is little evidence 
of increased public willingness to contact the police; the increase in those who said they 
would use the police for a problem of personal safety was confined to non-vulnerable 
households. The police continue to have a bad reputation among the public. While there 
is evidence that people believe the courts ought to help them, the use of the courts 
remains low. 
Policy implications of this study are augmented by the recommendations of policy 
analysts who investigated the devolution reforms. The local government tiers of district 
government, tehsil administration and union administration desperately need 
harmonized planning and coordinated provision of services. These are imperative 
conditions without which, local governance can not make efficient use of resources. For 
the formulation of a system of fiscal transfers between different levels of government, it 
will be important to ensure transparency and to give local governments the authority to 
raise additional resources. Awareness and education is required to be disseminated in the 
public about the devolution, their rights, and privileges and what they should expect of 
newly elected representatives and the local government executive (Cyan and Porter 
2004). 
As suggested by Cockcroft et al (2005), the strongest individual factor in users’ 
satisfaction was the user report of receiving medicines in government facilities. 
Reducing leakage of medicines and transparent accountability measures, which allow 
the clients to know the exact situation about medicines in the facilities, can help in this 
situation. To improve the interaction between doctors and other health care providers 
and their patients, a solid customer oriented approach would be a better panacea. 
Institutional capacity building mechanisms are needed which would diminish the 
tendency of patronage by politicians e.g. establishment of independent Public Service 
   54
 
Commissions that are given supervisory role in the recruitment and career management 
of key service delivery personnel; improvements in the legal, and regulatory framework 
for procurement in order to provide citizens with access to key public records (Hasnain, 
2005).  
International experience also shows that policies that increase the information available 
to citizens, particularly specific information regarding particular government actions, 
can have a significant impact on increasing citizen pressures for improving services. For 
example, use of Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys, and publicizing these results, 
have had some successes in countries such as India, Uganda, Philippines, and Ukraine 
in enhancing the public awareness. Williamson et al (2005) was of the opinion that 
Local government managers must be equipped with the appropriate skills and resources. 
Local government staff’s conduct can be improved by giving local government 
managers APT powers.  
There should be innovative solutions developed to encourage staff to serve in remote 
areas i.e. provide additional allowances, building residential facilities at remote areas for 
teachers and heath workers along with all facilities. Checks and balances by district 
health and education staff, monitoring committees, and by the provincial governments 
can be carried out. Communities and union councilors should monitor staff’s attendance. 
Attendance lists could be displayed on school or health center’s notice board to make 
this information public. Complaint cells can be formed in districts and TMA councils 
for public consumers wishing to complain about the performance of teachers and health 
workers  (Williamson et al 2005).  
The Local Government Development Program (LGDP) in Uganda was created to 
provide a common set of standards for judging performance and at the same time to 
channel resources to local governments in ways that allowed local councilors to decide 
how they would be allocated. All local governments have access to a formula-based 
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local government grant, however their access and level of funding is dependent on the 
annual local-government assessment. Local governments are assessed on their corporate 
performance, against minimum requirements and benchmarks related to areas such as 
planning, budgeting, financial management, engineering capacity. The LGDP 
framework has provided a strong incentive for local governments to upgrade their 
corporate performance (ADB/DFID/World Bank 2004). A somewhat similar system, 
tailored in accordance with local political, social, and economical conditions, of grants 
from the centre can stimulate the pace of development in Pakistan.  
Decentralization itself is neither good or bad. It is a means to an end. Successful 
decentralization improves efficiency and responsiveness of public sector. This also 
requires educated leadership and literate masses. Similarly conducive environment like 
economic stability, capacity, awareness and civil society is also a prerequisite. It can be 
concluded from the aforementioned discussion that the current local government 
reforms agenda of government of Pakistan is an effort to devolve responsibility to 
elected local governments in order to facilitate the transition to good governance.     
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